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The allocation of time is a crucial decision that influences many aspects of household welfare, above all 
consumption, income level and home production. This paper presents a new methodology to estimate woman 
domestic productivity using a French time use survey, at least whenever the recursivity property for constrained 
utility maximization with home production applies. 
It provides empirical evidence not rejecting a collective model of household decision making over working time, 
as the sum of time spent in domestic production and market labor time. Our results show also that female 
domestic productivity is a relevant variable explaining intra-household distribution of resources. 
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∗   World Bank, Washington and Delta, Paris 




2. A collective household model with home production 
3. The identification of woman’s domestic productivity 
4. The testing strategy on the household total labor supply  
5. Sample selection and description 
6. Estimation results 
7. Conclusion  
References  
Appendix 
           7
1. Introduction  
 
The allocation of time is a crucial decision that influences many aspects of 
household welfare. On one side, the way household members allocate their time among 
various economic activities is an important determinant of the level of household 
income. For instance, low income households devote large amounts of time to activities 
such as cooking or sewing in order to meet the basic needs of their members.  
On the other side, time use by household members might well be affected by the 
distribution of income and “spending power” within a household.  
In the most recent economic literature, the issue of intra-household decisions has 
been deeply analysed by collective models since the pioneer work of Chiappori (1988). 
The basic model sees each household as characterised by a pre-defined distribution of 
"spending power" (and so utility distribution) between its members; it uses this to set 
income transfers within the household and then each family member determines their 
own private consumption and leisure by maximising individual preferences subject to a 
post-transfer individual budget constraint. This achieves Pareto efficient allocations 
within a household. Using this framework, testable restrictions can be derived and the 
household specific sharing arrangements (the so called “income sharing rule”) can be 
retrieved up to an additive constant. 
Several empirical applications and hypothesis testing have been produced (among 
others, Fortin and Lacroix, 1997, Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix, 2002, and Blundell R., 
Chiappori P. A., Magnac T. and Meghir C., 2001) and they are all consistent in not 
rejecting the collective view of intra-household decision, using mainly data on 
individual labor supply of two-earner households. 
However, given the paucity of time use surveys, they make a strong assumption: 
i.e. that all time not spent on the labor market is pure leisure, with positive effects on 
individual preferences; in other words they exclude time devoted to domestic work like 
home production or child care. Thus, the drawback of the literature produced so far is an 
unsatisfactory measure for pure leisure (see the critique addressed in Apps and Rees, 
1997). Such a framework could easily provide a biased evidence on the within 
household decision process as lower female labor market hours would be equated to a 
larger share of the household’s full income according to a predefined “sharing rule”. 
The reality instead might be that also home production time is traded for monetary  8
income, as domestic production accounts for more than half of the time devoted by a 
woman to economic activities.  
From a theoretical perspective Chiappori (1997) extends the basic model to home 
production and proves that under certain hypotheses still the intra-household 
distribution of resources can be recovered up to a constant. In particular, he shows that 
results differ according to whether or not the domestic good is substitute for market 
goods. In the first case, the price for domestic goods is exogenously fixed at the market 
level, and when the production function shows constant returns to scale, it is possible 
first to retrieve the production function up to a multiplicative constant, and then the 
income sharing rule up to an additive constant. Alternatively, the price of domestic good 
is an endogenous piece of information; however, the retrieval of the production function 
with constant return to scale still allows to identify the income sharing rule, although up 
to an additive function of individual wages. 
More recently, availability of time use surveys raised the interest in the estimation 
of household model with domestic production. In particular, Aronsson, Daunfeldt and 
Wikstrom (2001) develop and test a collective model on a sample of Swedish 
households; however, the system of leisure demands is estimated with a home 
production specified in reduced form. The same drawback is in Rapoport, Sofer and 
Solaz (2003) which provides evidence from France. 
In this paper we discuss the relevance of fully specifying a household model in 
which decisions are taken with respect to consumption, leisure, market working time 
and time devoted to home production. The framework chosen is such that household 
welfare is affected by the distribution of individual capacities to produce income and to 
provide domestic goods and services. 
The innovative contribution of the paper is threefold: 
(a) we develop a new technique that allows to estimate women domestic productivity 
when only the use of time is observed, and we provide an application to a French 
time use survey; 
(b) we investigate intra-household allocation of “total” (market and domestic) work; 




The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical 
framework and presents the assumption necessary to identify domestic productivity. In 
Section 3 we choose a functional form for home production and specify the estimation 
framework. Section 4 presents the testing strategy on the total labor supply. The main 
characteristics of the sample of French households are reported in Section 5. Finally, 
results obtained from the empirical estimation of the model are contained in Section 6 
and Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. A collective household model with home production 
 
As in a standard framework, we consider individual preferences defined over 
consumption of a composite good  i C  (with i=m, f) and pure leisure  i l . The budget 
constraint defines total household income as the sum of labor and non labor incomes 
and the monetary value of home production. In such a framework, we define the 
problem of household welfare maximization as the following: 
 
() ( ) ( )
() () () f f f m m m f f m m f m
f f f f f m m m m m
f l m l f C m C
h g h g Q t w t w y C C t s
t h T C U t h T C U
π π
θ θ
, , , . .
, 1 , max
, , ,
+ + + ≤ +
− − − + − −
   (1) 
 
where in (1)  i i i i l h t T = − −  since individual leisure  i l  together with time for home 
production  i h  and labor market time  i t  adds up to  i T , the individual total time 
endowment. In problem (1) the price for composite good  i C  is normalised to 1 and Q(.) 
is a household production function separable in the two individual arguments, i.e. the 
individual time devoted to home production and individual domestic productivity  i π . 
One could argue that, although quite general, model (1) disregards direct positive 
effects on individual utility coming from working time on job or at home. That is 
because in (1) only time for pure leisure and direct consumption increase individual 
utility. However, such an assumption is less stringent than first thought, since we do not 
consider child care as domestic production and define total time endowment  i T  net of 
time devoted to child care. As a consequence, our results, presented under the  10
assumption of egoistic preferences, easily extend to preferences separable in an 
argument capturing altruism for children’s quality of life.  
In (1) θ  is a weighting factor assigned to individual preferences taking a value in 
the closed interval [0,1]. According to two opposite views in the literature, two 
alternative assumptions can be made on θ . If it is a constant term, then problem (1) can 
be inserted in the traditional “unitary” approach to household decision modelling. 
However, the main critique addressed to this type of models is that they disregard intra-
household decision making.  
A more general model is the “collective” model
1, where θ  is a function of 
exogenous attributes, such as non labor income y, individual wage rates  i w  and 
distributional factors  κ , i.e.  ( ) κ , , , f m w w y θ θ = . The paper by Chiappori, Fortin and 
Lacroix (2002) (CFL henceforth) provides various examples of distributional factors, as 
the divorce laws, or the so-called sex ratio, that is the relative scarcity of women 
compared to men, or the share of non labor income under control by one spouse and 
defines them as “variables that can affect the intra-household decision process without 
influencing individual preferences or the joint consumption set”(see p.3). 
The point we raise in this paper is that individual domestic productivity  i π  could 
well determine the decision process over home production, but also could partly explain 
the intra-household allocation process over time and consumption, as it might directly 
affects θ . If we will find enough evidence not to be able to reject the null, then the same 
will be also a sufficient evidence against the standard unitary framework. 
Solving out problem (1) proves that optimal decisions over time use depends on 
preferences, technology in the production activity and exogenous income variables. 
Whenever the marginal productivity of domestic labor time at zero is larger than the 
individual market wage rate, then it is efficient for the household member to participate 
to the labor market and considers to spend some positive amount of time for domestic 
activities. In such a case, from previous literature
2 we know that problem (1) satisfies 
the  recursivity property for interior solutions, that is, whenever  0 > i t  and  0 ≥ i h , 
                                                 
1 See Browning and Chiappori (1998) or Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2004)  
2 See Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986), the first study to insist on this property for agricultural 
households, but also Chiappori (1997) or Udry (1996).  11
problem (1) can be solved in two-stages. In particular, defining  i i i h t L + =  as total 
labor time, (1) can be re-written as the following: 
 
() ( ) ( )
∗ + + + ≤ +
− − + −
P L w L w y C C t s
L T C U L T C U
f f m m f m
f f f f m m m m
f l m l f C m C
. .
, 1 , max
, , ,
θ θ
    (2) 
 
where P* is the solution to the profit maximization problem: 
 
() ( ) () f f m m f f f m m m h w h w h g h g Q P − − = ∗ π π , , , max    (3) 
Note that in (3) the price of the domestic composite good has been normalised to 1, 
under the assumption that the output Q(.) is a substitute for market goods (marketable 
domestic good)
3.  
A first result this paper aims to achieve is the estimation of individual domestic 
productivity, whenever the recursivity property applies. Take the first order condition of 











      ( 4 ) ,  
also reproduced in Figure 1. If member i works more than hi
* then he/she will be 
working both on the market and at home. Although we know that the total number of 
working hours depends on preferences as well as on income variables, including the 
other spouse’s wage, nevertheless, due to the separability property between problems 
(2) and (3) the optimal redistribution of working time between home production and 
paid work is only affected by individual domestic productivity and his/her market wage.  
Denoting  h g  as the first derivative of g with respect to  i h , under the assumption 
of monotonicity for  () ⋅ Q and  () ⋅ g , both functions 
i g Q and  h g  can be inverted and 







π , 1 −
=       ( 5 ) .  
                                                 
3 As shown in Chiappori (1997), this rather plausible assumption allows to fully identify the income 
sharing rule up to an additive constant.  12
 
 
















As it will be clarified later, we can use condition (5) to estimate the 
unobservable individual domestic productivity  i π : 
-  as a source of heterogeneity in the relationship between domestic hours of 
work and the individual wage rate; 
-  after choosing a functional form for home production. 
 
A further aim of the paper is the analysis of the intra-household allocation of 
total working time and the empirical testing for the collective model. In particular, 
under the assumption of egoistic or caring preferences, problem (2) is equivalent to: 
( )
i i i i
i i i
i l i C
L w C t s





,    ( i=m, f)  (6) 
where  i φ  is member i share of total income, exogenously fixed and including home 
production. In other words,  i φ  is the so-called “income sharing rule”. In order for 
wi
Marginal product of domestic labor  
hi*  13
individual budget constraints to meet the total household income, the condition 
y P y f m = + = + * φ φ  has to hold.  
The collective framework so far specified imposes certain restrictions on the 
system of total labor supply, as it will be of the following type: 
( ) ( )
() () z z
z z
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
f m f m m f
f
f
f m f m m m
m
m
y w w y w L L





    (7). 
Taken z as a vector of demographic variables affecting both individual preferences and 
the income share  i φ , in Section 4 we will show how the particular structure of system 
(7) imposes testable restrictions on the labor supply behavior and allows to recover the 
individual income sharing rule  m φ  up to an additive function of z, if at least one 
distribution factor can be observed. In particular, note that an important testable 
restriction has to do with the role of domestic productivities, as stated in the following 
remark: 
 
Remark 1 Individual domestic productivity affects a collective system of household total 
labor supply through two channels:  
(i)  the total non labor income  y,    
(ii)  the weighing factor θ (or, equivalently the income share  i φ ).  
 
In a standard unitary model instead, domestic productivities should have only 
affected total labor supply through unearned income only, which, in principle, already 
provides a new test of the unitary versus the collective model. 
 
 
3. The identification of woman’s domestic productivity  
 
In the paper, we assume that the home production function has the following 
specification: 
() () () () ( ) f m f f f m m m f f f m m m h a h a h g h g Q γ γ π π π π + + + = , , ,    
with  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ i γ  ( i=m, f) (8).  14
The function Q(.) has two separable components which measures man’s and woman’s 
contribution to home production and both satisfying the property of decreasing return to 
scale. The additive separability hypothesis excludes cases of joint production. 
Solving problem (3) under the requirement that the home production is of type (8), 
it is possible to find that the first order condition (FOC) leading to a positive time spent 
in domestic production, whenever he/she also works, is: 
 
()i i i i i i w h a a i = + −1 γ π γ      (9) 
 
i.e. the condition of individual’s marginal domestic productivity (in monetary value) 
equal to his/her wage rate. According to the efficient condition (9), allocating working 
time to home production for a given level of labor market time, would depend on both 
individual domestic productivity and the salary level.  
As already shown in Section 2, condition (9) can be solved out to find the optimal 
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  0 > i h if   for i=m,f   (11). 
Note that  ∗ P  is independent of the intercept  i π  in the individual home production 
function. In other words, we find that for internal solutions only, the requirement of 
efficiency in home production implies that the system of total labor time (7) depends on 
the individual domestic productivity parameter  i π  only through  () ⋅ m φ , fully satisfying 
the definition for a distributional factor already provided by the literature on collective 
models.  15
As far as the identification of individual domestic productivity is concerned, from 
condition (9) we know that  i π  could be in principle identified from the observed 
individual wage rate, when  0 = i h . Alternatively, for  0 > i h ,  i π  can still be retrieved 
after introducing some heterogeneity in the model. In particular, the following steps 
show how the home production function can be estimated through the first order 
condition (10) when heterogeneity is imposed on the slope coefficient  i a  and on the 
intercept term  i π .  
Introduce heterogeneity in  i a  by rewriting this coefficient as: 
( ) i i i a a ε + = 1      ( 1 2 )  



























Considering that the second term may be rather small and taking first order 
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Let us now introduce observed heterogeneity in  i B : 
i i i i X B η β + = '       ( 1 4 )  
where  i η  is an error term, orthogonal to  i ε , which follows  ( ) η σ , 0 N  and captures also 
some measurement errors. Due to the recursivity property discussed in Section 2, 
condition (14) allows us to instrument  i π  on a vector of individual (not household) 
characteristics  i X . 
Finally, putting (13) and (14) together (ignoring the product of residual terms ε·η), 
the structural form for individual home production time becomes:  16
i i i i i
i
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     (15). 
Model (15) is non -linear in  i γ . It also exhibits heteroskedasticity with some restrictions 
linking the expected value of  i h  and the standard deviation of the error terms. 
Therefore, equation (15) could be estimated using maximum likelihood techniques 
(ML). The derivation of the log likelihood function is reported in Appendix 1.  
Using definition (14), the fitted value of  i π  will be given by the condition: 
) ˆ ' ( ˆ ˆ i i i i X a β π ⋅ =       ( 1 6 ) .  
 
 
4. The testing strategy on the household total labor supply  
 
Although testing for the relevance of individual domestic productivity in the 
household labor supply might already provide a preliminary evidence against the 
traditional unitary model, it is yet not sufficient as a test for the collective model. As 
shown in CFL and other studies, it is the way in which the distribution factor  i π  and the 
spouse’ wage rate do affect the two labor supplies that enables us to test for a general 
collective model of labor supply.  
Following CFL (their Proposition 3), we can derive a set of necessary conditions 
for any pair of ( ) f m L L ,  to be the solution of problem (6) for a given sharing rule  m φ . 
CFL show that observing one distribution factor and the individual wage rates is 
sufficient to impose a set of testable restrictions for a collective model on a system of 
labor supply and to recover the partials of the sharing rule with respect to total non labor 
income, each individual wage rate and the distribution factors  i π . 
Thus, in order to derive a series of parametric tests, we compare the collective 
approach with an unrestricted system of household labor supplies, in line with the 
testing strategy developed in CFL. However, the novelty here stays in the fact that, for 
the first time, we apply it to a system of total labor supply ( ) f m L L ,  as the sum of 
market working time and time devoted to domestic activities as solution of problem (3).  
In order to provide testable restrictions for the collective model as earlier 





log log log log log
' log
log log log log log
9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0
9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0
m m m y w m
y w m w w m y m w m w m m L
f f f y w f
y w f w w f y f w f w f f L
m f f
m m f f m
f
m f f
m m f f m
m
+ + + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + + + + =
+ + + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + + + + =
π π
π π   
  (17) 
 
System (17) has a semi-log functional form, as the one used by CFL, but more 
general in the sense that it allows more interactions in the variables. We call it 
unrestricted  because no cross-equation restrictions are imposed; however, it does 
provide the nesting framework to test for a collective model
4. 
Following CFL, we retrieve the necessary conditions for system (17) to be derived 
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Note that if restrictions (18) are satisfied, then the income sharing rule parameters 
can be identified up to a constant, as the partials of  m φ  are respectively: 
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φ         ( 1 9 )  
                                                 
4 Although we disregard in this paper testing for the unitary model, still the framework could have 
handled it. In particular, if we were in a unitary model, whenever each spouse is favourable to participate 
to the labor market and to produce domestic goods, the household labor supply system (including both 
market and non-market working time), satisfies two sets of restrictions; they are the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a household utility function to be maximised, subject to a household budget 
constraint: 
a)  the Slutsky matrix must be symmetric and positive semi-definite; 
b)  a further set of condition is due to the irrelevance of individual domestic productivities in the 
decision process. 
These conditions translate into the following testable sets: 
a) the Slutsky matrix of compensated wage effects is symmetric and positive semi-definite if, either:  
0 6 5 4 3 2 = = = = = f f f f f ;   0 6 5 4 3 1 = = = = = m m m m m ;   
when the system of total labor supply depends on own wage and preference factors, or:  
0 6 5 4 2 1 = = = = = f f f f f ;   0 6 5 4 2 1 = = = = = m m m m m ;   
if it depends on total non-labor income and preference factors;  
b)  irrelevance of individual domestic productivities in the unitary decision process implies that: 
0 7 7 = = m f .  18
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where  3 5 3 5 m f f m − = ∆ . Integrating the four differential equations system in (19) we can 
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in (20) τ is an additive function of ( ) z . 
Finally, note that the system of total labor supply associated with a collective 
setting is:  
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where  () 5 5 1 5 1 1 / m m f f m − = α ;  7 2 / m ∆ = α ; ( ) 5 5 2 5 2 1 / f m f f m − = β ;  5 2 / f ∆ − = β .  
For the sake of completeness, the functional form in (21) can be obtained solving 
an individual utility maximization problem, where preferences have an exponential 
indirect utility form (see Stern, 1986) as the followings:  
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and system (21) can be derived applying Roy’s identity  () i i
i





, =  (with i=m ,f) 
and taking  m f y φ φ − = , in order to meet the household budget constraint. 
 
 
5. Sample selection and description  
 
The data-set used in this study is the INSEE (1999) survey Enquête Emploi Du 
Temps 1998-99, which is the broadest experiment ever conducted in France of data 
collection for household time use. It includes information on main demographic 
characteristics, labor supply, incomes and use of time for a sample of 8,186 French 
households (20,370 individuals). Data on the use of time were collected for household 
members 15 years old or older (15,441 individuals in 7,949 households); they received 
and filled a booklet reporting information on the use of time in minutes in a weekly day. 
The potential of the survey is clear-cut once it is compared with a previous time use 
survey by INSEE, collected in 1986, which had the limit of providing time use 
information on one member per household, rendering it useless for our study. 
Being interested in analysing couple’s time allocation process, we only consider 
households whose head lives in couple (corresponding to 64.75 percent of the total 
sample). Moreover, we also select those households with head and spouse being 25-60 
years old. As our framework does not raise retirement and unemployment issues, we 
exclude households with couple members being either retired or unemployed; 
moreover, under the assumption that income variables might not be reliable, we do not 
consider families with head or spouse being self-employed.  
To begin with, we disregard use of time on holidays or during the weekend, as 
time use in spare time might be driven by significantly different purposes. Therefore, a 
further selection (2,482 households, about 56 percent of the selected sample) considers 
family members interviewed in working days only. Later on, however, as a sensitivity 
analysis, we empirically test whether our approach extends to the allocation of time over 
the weekend. 
Finally, 31 percent of the selected sample reported missing income variables, and 
as a consequence were disregard them. Thus, the final sample of our study has 674 
observations and its main characteristics are reported in Table 1.   20
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for couples  
 no. mean std.  dev.
(1) Household  Characteristics 
Household without children (a) 166 0.25










Home- ownership status   674 0.63
Total weekly unearned income  (b) (c) 674 79.99 185.69
 
(2) Men Characteristics 
Age 674 42.34 9.10
Education:                               Primary school 674 0.25
Secondary school 674 0.13
Univ. and post-grad. Degrees 674 0.27
Employment Characteristics:     Participation 674 0.91
Weekly contract hours of work  612 37.95 4.89
Net hourly wage  (b) 612 10.03 6.35
(2) Women Characteristics 
Age 674 39.99 8.73
Education:                               Primary school 674 0.27
Secondary school 674 0.16
Univ. and post-grad. Degrees 674 0.28
Employment Characteristics:     Participation 674 0.64
Weekly contract hours of work  432 33.34 9.25
Net hourly wage  (b) 432 8.31 4.89
Note: (a) the number of positive observations only is reported. 
(b) Nominal variables in Euro 
(c) Unearned income is a derived variable from total household income net of couple’s labor 
income.  21
In the survey the description provided for each line of activity is very accurate: it 
contains duration, place and activity type (classified in about 90 codes). Following 
INSEE (2000) we recode the reported activities into six main categories:  
a)  personal time,  
b)  domestic time,  
c)  child care,  
d)  market working time,  
e)  travel time,  
f)  leisure.  
To give a flavour of the contents of each category we provide some examples of 
activity for each of them. Personal time includes sleeping, self-care, private activities or 
eating; home-production time adds up minutes spent in cooking, cleaning, sowing, 
washing, doing shopping or gardening. The category of child care includes time spent 
playing with children whereas market working time comprises paid work also if done at 
home, training, learning and time breaks. Leisure considers various types of 
entertainment as sports, reading, cinema, listening music, watching TV, relaxing, and 
social activities as voluntary work, religious practices and telephone conversations. 
Although two activities (main and secondary) could have been reported in the 
booklet whenever more than one was performed at the same time, we restrict our 
analysis to main activities only, as the secondary activity is not frequently mentioned.  
Table 2 contains some descriptive statistics on the percentage of time devoted to 
each activity in a day for each spouse. Adding up market work, home production and 
child care, women spend more time than men working. Note also that men devote most 
of their working time on the job, whereas time is almost equally shared between paid 
and unpaid work for women. 
Child care only apparently seems not to be playing a relevant role. Restricting the 
analysis to the sample of young households with at least one child 0-3 years old (116 
households) women spend more than 10 percent of their time exclusively taking care of 
their children.  
Another interesting picture concerning time use comes out of Table 3 which 
contains the statistically significant correlation matrix across spouses activities. As we 
could expect, there is a high complementarity in working time between spouses, proven  22
not only by a positive correlation (0.2) between their market working time but also by a 
negative correlation between individual leisure and partner’s working time. Similarly 
individual leisure is also positively correlated with the spouse one. There is instead no 
evidence of joint domestic production (consistent with our assumption of separability in 
the production function), rather women time for home production is positively 
correlated with men’s leisure. 
 
Table 2 Couple’s time use  
  mean std. dev.
 
Men daily time use (in percent) 
Duration of personal time  0.44 0.08
Duration of market working time  0.31 0.12
Duration of home production time  0.06 0.07
Duration of leisure  0.13 0.09
Duration of travel time  0.05 0.04
Duration of child care  0.01 0.02
Women daily time use (in percent) 
Duration of personal time   0.43 0.07
Duration of market working time   0.20 0.16
Duration of home production time   0.19 0.12
Duration of leisure   0.11 0.08
Duration of travel time   0.04 0.04
Duration of child care  0.03 0.06












Market working time  0.197 *  -  -0.223 * 
Home production time  - -  0.091 
Leisure  -0.205 *  -  0.350 * 
Note: Only correlation indexes significant at the 95% level are reported  




Figure 2 describes the distribution of working (market and non market) activities 
(in minutes) for the sample of households with both spouses participating to the labor 
market. It is striking the high percentage of men with zero value for home production, 
and as expected individual market working time in both cases peaks at 8 hours, the so-
called “contract hours”. 
Finally, consider that for both partners market working time and home production 
are negatively correlated, however women’s coefficient takes a much higher value (-





Figure 2 Intra household allocation of time – Sample of two-earner households  
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6. Estimation results  
 
6.1 Measuring individual domestic productivity 
 
Following the theoretical analysis described in Sections 2 and 3 we carry out the 
estimation of individual domestic productivity by means of a two step procedure, which 
allows us to correct for sample selection bias, when we estimate time devoted to home 
production for the specific sub-sample of individuals that work on the labor market and 
produce domestic goods. 
With respect to this issues men and women of the selected sample and in 
families from most western countries view the problem of time allocation from 
completely different perspectives. Women, given their domestic technology, their 
preferences for consumption and leisure and share of income, explicitly consider all the 
possible available options before making a choice on whether to work on the labour 
market and produce domestic goods. Instead men ultimately do not consider as an 
option paid work, but only domestic production. Such well-known stylised facts drive 
our research strategy to estimate individual domestic productivities following two 
distinct directions. 
In particular, in order to estimate women domestic productivity we introduce a 
latent variable  *
f I  capturing, in reduced form, the joint female participation decision to 
the labor market and to domestic production.  *
f I  is defined as: 
g X d Y I f f ' ' * + =       ( 2 4 )  
where the vector Xf contains a set of individual characteristics (age, education etc.) 
whereas Y is a vector of household characteristics and (d, g) are two coefficient vectors. 
We also construct a dichotomous variable  f I  such that  0 1 * ≥ ⇔ = f f I I  and 
0 0 * < ⇔ = f f I I ; this indicates the alternative chosen. Since Heckman (1979), we 
know that the full log-likelihood function of our model can be decomposed into the 
“selection model”, where only the parameters ( ) ρ , ,g d  are estimated, and a “conditional 
outcome model”, which estimates the parameters vectors in (15) and the covariance 
matrix, holding () ρ , ,g d  fixed at the estimated values ( ) ρ ˆ , ˆ , ˆ g d . Given consistent  25
estimators of ( ) ρ ˆ , ˆ , ˆ g d  in the first stage, one can also obtain consistent estimators of the 
structural form in (15). In other words, our two-step estimation considers: 
a.  a preliminary estimation of a probit equation for the joint decision to 
participate to the labor market and spend a positive amount of time for 
domestic production, in reduced form; 
b.  the estimation of women time devoted to home production using the 
structural form (15) and controlling for selection bias involved in the 
simultaneous choice of working and producing domestic goods by including 
the inverse of the Mill’s ratio  f λ , obtained from the first stage estimation. 
 
Empirical estimates of the first step are presented in Table 4. Among the 
household characteristics included in the regression, the joint decision is mainly 
affected by a non linear function of age; also the higher is household non labor income 
the less likely the woman combines paid work with the domestic one. Instead a higher 
investment in education provides strong incentives for a woman to offer more work. 
Finally, playing the role of a demand factor for home production as an exclusive 
activity, the number of children has a discouraging impact, with an additional effect 
when they are 0-3 years old. 
A result highlighted in Section 2 is that optimal time devoted to home 
production, when it is also efficient to offer paid work, is affected by individual 
characteristics only. Note that such property is valid regardless of the framework 
adopted (unitary or collective). 
Results from the second step, i.e. the estimation of women time devoted to home 
production, are reported in Table 5. In support of the non-linear function of wage, 
derived from the marginal condition (10), both the estimated coefficients for  f A  and 
f γ  are consistent with a decreasing return to scale production function and satisfy the 
negative relation between the time devoted to domestic production and the wage rate. 
The intercept term  f f a π  is instrumented with a polynomial function of age and three 
educational dummies. Women domestic productivity increases with age but at a 
decreasing rate, whereas lower education associates with lower domestic productivity, 
provided that the reference categories are higher degrees of schooling. A common  26
negative constant term indicates a lower bound, i.e. a fixed cost, above which a positive 
value for domestic production can be obtained. 
 
 
Table 4 The probability for a woman jointly participating to labor market 
and producing domestic goods  
Variables  
Woman’s age  0.422   (0.077) *** 
Woman’s age 
2 -0.005    (0.001) *** 
Non labor income  -0.002   (0.000) *** 
Man’s Wage  -0.008   (0.010)  
Woman Educational Dummies: Bac technique  0.606   (0.274) ** 
                                                   Bac +2   0.429   (0.197) ** 
Univ. and post-grad. degree  0.544   (0.220) *** 
Number of children  -0.396   (0.062) *** 
No. of children 0-3 years old  -0.499   (0.158) *** 
Other adult  0.291   (0.385)  
City dummy: Paris  0.091   (0.168)  
Internet service at home  0.592   (0.263) ** 
Constant   -6.746   (1.466) *** 
Obs.   612   
Pseudo 
2 R =0.22 
(***: p ≤ 00 1 . ; **: 00 1 00 5 .. <≤ p ;  *: 00 5 01 0 .. < ≤ p ) 
Note: In the table results of a probit estimation and standard errors in brackets. Reference 
categories for categorical variables: women with a degree CAP/BEP or Bac general and not 
living in the capital.   27
Table 5 Estimation of women home production 
Variables 
f A   0.616 (0.189) ***
f γ   0.389   (0.103) ***
f B  :  Constant  -0.148 (0.064) **
Woman age  0.010 (0.003) ***
    Woman age
2  -0.000 (0.000) **
CAP/BEP school  -0.018 (0.007) ***
Bac technique  0.003 (0.012)
Bac general   -0.034 (0.011) ***
f λ  
0.016 (0.011)
ε σ  
0.359 (0.142) ***
η σ  
0.000   (0.045)
Obs. 401
  L log =559.82 
Note: in the table results by ML estimation corrected for female 
participation to labor market and domestic production. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Reference category for categorical variables: Bac+2 and 
University and postgraduate degree.    
 
 
Given the estimation of the error term  fj ε , each parameter of the production 
function can be derived, as already stated in Section 3. Results are contained in Table 6.  
 
 
Table 6 Estimated coefficients of women home production function 
Variable Mean  Std  dev Min Max
f a   22.613 8.536 6.877 51.508
f π   1.485 0.463 -0.053 2.136
f γ   0.389   0.000 0.389   0.389  
  28
 
Table 6.a Estimated productivity and predicted wage rate: a comparison  
Variable Mean  Std  dev Min Max
f π   1.485 0.463 -0.053 2.136
f w ˆ   8.232   1.044 6.473   11.224  
Note: In the table results of the predicted values for the productivity term  f π  and the 
woman wage rate instrumented with the same demographic variables (a non linear 
function of age and three educational dummies). Correlation coefficient between the 
two variables 0.365. 
 
We also investigate whether the estimated values for  f π  differ from the female 
wage rates: in particular, as a further check, we regress the latter on the same regressors 
used as instruments for  f π  and results reported in Table 6.a shows a high discrepancy 
and a low correlation coefficient.  
As a sensitivity analysis, we also consider a more general model. In particular, 
instead of selecting only the sample of couples interviewed in week days, we also 
examine whether our model would determine how women in couple allocate their time 
between market work and home production during a whole week (week-end included).   
Thus, let  f h  be the total hours of domestic production determined by the model, 
that is after equalizing the marginal product of hours of work with the wage rate. 
Consider two distinct values for  f h , depending on the day of the interview. Let then 
wd
f h  be hours of work for those people observed during a weekday and  we
f h  hours of 
work of people observed during the week-end.  
Provided that  f
wd
f h p h ⋅ =  and  () f
we
f h p h ⋅ − = 1 , with 0<p<1, then a 
generalization of the model described in (16) - when both samples are considered -
would imply the following for observed hours,  o
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where D is a dummy for being observed on a week-day and ϑ  is a coefficient, capturing 
the probability p.  
If a model of optimal week-time allocation as in (25) was a better representation 
for the household decision process, we would expect that women with a high salary 
should do less home production on week-ends, when they may have less constraint on 
their time.  
However, results obtained estimating equation (25) by ML on a sample of 778 
observations (401 couples interviewed on a week day and 377 over the weekend) were 
largely unsatisfactory.  
A plausible explanation is that, due to the constraints set by the market, a worker 
with a high wage will do more paid work during the week– i.e. when the market is 
‘open’- and postpone more domestic work in the week-end. In other words, the model 
examined as first seems more appropriate, as it is derived under the assumption that the 
optimal allocation of time between paid and unpaid work is valid only on week-days, 
since the time to be spent on home production during week-ends cannot be determined 
by the wage rate; rather it should result from some optimal allocation between pure 
leisure and home production. Thus we found that the dichotomy between production 
and consumption examined in this study for working women breaks down during the 
weekend. 
On the basis of such evidence, we can conclude that an additional hour of 
domestic production is traded with market time, for a constant leisure, only on 
weekdays as on average women cannot go to work on week-ends and cannot postpone 
all domestic consumption to week-ends either. Overall, we consider this result as further 
evidence supporting our model of efficient allocation between home production and 
market working time during a week, but excluding the weekend.   30
Before discussing results from the labor supply estimation, we briefly raise the 
issue of the lack of evidence found for men domestic production. Several attempts made 
with various sophisticated models (as a non linear tobit model) were unable to find 
convincing results. Thus we can only conclude that time devoted to home production by 
men is only randomly chosen after their working time has been fixed by contract. As a 
consequence we are not in the position to estimate men domestic productivity  m π  by 
means of the INSEE time use survey and we consider is as a random component in the 
production function. 
 
6.2 The estimation of labor supply  
 
In what follows we present the estimation results of the household labor supply, 
using two alternative measures of working time as dependent variable, specifically:  
a)  individual market labor time, measured in minutes spent in paid work 
during a day, as it is commonly done in standard literature; 
b)  total labor supply, as the sum of market labor time and time devoted to 
home production.  
 
A well-known drawback of market labor supply estimations run especially with 
European survey data is that due to the rationing imposed by labor contracts, they 
usually do not seem to respond significantly to wages and income. This is particularly 
relevant for men labor supply (see Pencavel, 1986 for a survey). As a consequence, an 
interesting exercise is to investigate whether the same result holds true also when 
working time does include time hours in home production. 
In either case, we estimate the household labor supply by full information 
maximum likelihood (FIML), which provides efficient estimates of the parameters of 
simultaneous equations, since it can handle both plausible correlation between the error 
terms in the male and female labor supply and heteroskedasticity in the errors in an 
unknown form. 
Another relevant consideration is that wage rates, and non-labor income, 
entering in the household labor supply system, are not exogenous to hours of work. 
There are various reasons for considering the two sets of variables as endogenous; in  31
particular, for the wage rate, one should consider the so-called “division bias”, since it is 
a derived variable (yearly after-tax labor earnings divided by the product of working 
weeks per year and working hours per week), and also the presence of unobservable 
components (e.g., preferences for work) which might influence both wages and hours. 
Moreover, even individual non-labor income could include endogenous components, as, 
for instance, it might well be derived from labor income savings.  
In order to overcome the potential endogenity problem, all variables are 
accurately instrumented with exogenous socio-demographic variables (individual age 
and educational level, also interacted), number of children with an additional effect 
when they are 0-3 years old, the presence of another adult co-residing, living in the city 
of Paris and an internet link provided in the house (see final Appendix for results)
5.  
Following system (17), each labor supply equation also includes personal age in 
an exponential form, educational dummies and the presence of children 0-3 years old. 
Finally, female labor supply is corrected for selection bias, by adding in the labor 
supply equation the inverse of the Mills’ ratio ( w λ )  obtained from a previous 
estimation of her participation to the labor market (see Table 3.a in the Appendix); we 
use as extra identifying variables for women participation three regional dummies 
(detecting the household residence in the North, West, or Central- East of the country). 
Table 7 lists coefficients and asymptotic standard errors obtained from the 
estimation of market labor time, in the first column, and of total labor supply in the 
second. As expected, we find a very low significance level in male market labor supply, 
which seems rigidly fixed at a constant level. The significance level improves in 
estimating women market labor supply, which is affected by unearned income not only 
directly, but also when interacted with family wages. Also female domestic productivity 
has a significant negative impact on her own market labor supply, as evidence of a 
substitution effect prevailing; this result is also consistent with the negative correlation 
between market working time and home production found in the data description. The 
significance of  w λ  confirms that the sub-sample selected of working wife is not 
randomly drawn, although it has an unexpected negative sign. 
                                                 
5 Individual wage estimates were not corrected for selection bias, as a preliminary investigation did not 
provide a better fit.  32
Table 7: The household labor supply system: the unrestricted model  
MEN  Market labor supply  Total labor supply 
log m w ˆ   -0.551   (2.658)  -4.131   (2.615) * 
log f w ˆ    0.165   (2.063)  -1.600   (2.031)     
y ˆ    0.024   (0.126)    -0.071   (0.124) 
log m w ˆ × log f w ˆ   -0.294   (0.854)   0.770    (0.841)  
log m w ˆ ×  y ˆ     0.016   (0.049)     0.006   (0.048)     
log f w ˆ ×  y ˆ   -0.028   (0.090)       0.028   (0.088) 
f π ˆ    0.265   (0.319)       -0.608   (0.314) ** 
Man’s age   0.090   (0.142)      0.429   (0.139) *** 
Man’s age 
2  -0.001   (0.002)     -0.004   (0.001) *** 
Bac general   0.692    (0.553)        0.736   (0.544)    
Bac +2    0.908    (0.627)        1.258   (0.617)   ** 
Univ. degrees    1.661   (0.933)   *    1.959   (0.915)   ** 
Child 0-3 years old  -0.133   (0.274)       0.548   (0.269)   ** 
Constant   7.917   (5.127)    9.140   (5.047)   * 
WOMEN  Market labor supply  Total labor supply 
log m w ˆ    0.464   (2.208)    -0.526   (1.806) 
log f w ˆ    0.997   (2.380)      0.450   (1.946) 
y ˆ   -0.307   (0.146) **     -0.314   (0.119) *** 
log m w ˆ × log f w ˆ   -0.365    (0.942)      -0.256   (0.770) 
log m w ˆ ×  y ˆ    -0.151   (0.057) ***     -0.094   (0.046) *** 
log f w ˆ ×  y ˆ    0.346   (0.104) ***       0.268   (0.085) *** 
f π ˆ   -1.733   (0.511) ***  -0.076   (0.418)  
Woman’s age   0.070   (0.028) ***   0.040   (0.023)* 
Bac technique   0.645   (0.449) *   0.120   (0.366)  
Bac general   -0.464   (0.505)   -0.502   (0.412) 
Bac +2   0.302   (0.314)       -0.019   (0.255) 
Child 0-3 years old   0.484    (0.355)  -0.363   (0.290) 
Constant   6.458   (5.267)  10.158   (4.308)   ** 
w λ   -1.726   (0.461) ***  -0.448   (0.376) 
  LogL= -1595.078; ρ=0.29  LogL= -1508.527; ρ=0.31 
Note: FIML estimates of two simultaneous equation by semi-log household labor supply: 
sample of two earner couples (397 obs.). Each regression includes a correlation between the 
errors (ρ).  33
Table 8 The unrestricted vs. the collective model of household total labor supply  
MEN  Unrestricted system  Collective Model 
log m w ˆ   -4.131   (2.615) *  -1.392   (1.241) 
log f w ˆ   -1.600   (2.031)       0.014   (0.628) 
y ˆ   -0.071   (0.124)  -0.071   (0.156) 
log m w ˆ × log f w ˆ    0.770    (0.841)   -0.061 
log m w ˆ ×  y ˆ     0.006   (0.048)      -0.021   (0.043) 
log f w ˆ ×  y ˆ    0.0277   (0.088)   0.060 
f π ˆ   -0.608   (0.314) **  -0.053 
Man’s age   0.429   (0.139) ***   0.287   (0.127)  ** 
Man’s age 
2  -0.004   (0.001) ***   0.003   (0.002)   ** 
Bac general   0.736   (0.544)      0.574   (0.516)   
Bac +2    1.258   (0.617)   **   0.866   (0.559) 
Univ. degrees    1.959   (0.915)   **   1.485   (0.875) * 
Child 0-3 years old   0.548   (0.269)   **   0.576   (0.270)  ** 
Constant   9.140   (5.047)   *   6.403   (2.474)  *** 
WOMEN  Unrestricted system  Collective Model 
log m w ˆ   -0.526   (1.806)  -0.481   (1.847) 
log f w ˆ    0.450   (1.946)   0.499   (1.973) 
y ˆ   -0.314   (0.119) ***  -0.311   (0.120) *** 
log m w ˆ × log f w ˆ   -0.256   (0.770)  -0.271   (0.790) 
log m w ˆ ×  y ˆ    -0.094   (0.046) ***  -0.091   (0.050) * 
log f w ˆ ×  y ˆ    0.268   (0.085) ***   0.263   (0.090) *** 
f π ˆ   -0.076   (0.418)   -0.233   (0.598) 
Age   0.040   (0.023)*   0.048   (0.030) * 
Bac technique   0.120   (0.366)    0.177   (0.373) 
Bac general   -0.502   (0.412)  -0.629   (0.477) 
Bac +2  -0.019   (0.255)   0.008   (0.262) 
Child 0-3 years old  -0.363   (0.290)  -0.361   (0.292) 
Constant  10.158   (4.308)   **   9.946   (4.340)  ** 
w λ   -0.448   (0.376)  -0.460   (0.376) 
  LogL= -1508.527; ρ=0.31  LogL= -1510.8693; ρ= 0.33 
Note: FIML estimates of two simultaneous equation. Semi-log system of household total labor 
supply: sample of two earner couples (397 obs.). Coefficients without standard error are 
constrained.   34





log L  -1508.527 -1510.869 
LR (dof)  -             4.685 (3)
Note: Sample of households with both spouses 
working 
 
The quality of the estimations improves when moving to total labor supply. In 
particular, the husband’s one is affected negatively by his own wage rate and by a few 
demographic variables (in particular age, age squared, having a child 0-3 years old and 
higher educational dummies). The significance of the female domestic productivity term 
in the male labor supply equation already provides sufficient evidence against the 
traditional unitary model, as it has been clarified in Section 2 and 3. 
Conversely, the woman’s total working hours are affected by nearly all the 
variables influencing her market labor supply, except for the domestic productivity and 
the  w λ  terms.  
Table 8 contains in the second column the parameter estimates of the collective 
system of total labor supply, i.e. once restrictions (18) are imposed, whereas the first 
column reports the estimates of the unrestricted model, already presented in the 
previous table, to facilitate a comparison. Overall signs and significance level are 
confirmed, also when the necessary collective restrictions hold. 
Table 9 compares the log-likelihood values obtained from the estimation of 
system (21), unrestricted and with the restrictions derived in section 1, and reports the 
derived likelihood ratio statistics. On the basis of the evidence found, the three 
restrictions imposed by the collective model cannot be statistically rejected (LR test 
() χ 3
2 =4.685). 
Empirical results from the estimation of the collective model is completed with 
the computation of the parameters and the asymptotic standard errors (obtained by the 
‘delta method’) of the income sharing rule (see Table 10). The sign of the coefficients of 
the income sharing rule and of the partials are reported in the second column. They 
imply that an increase in the husband’s wage rate tends to reduce substantially his 
transfer to the wife, as well as an increase in the wife’s wage rate, although the effect is  35
smaller. These results suggest that women of our sample behaves more altruistically 
than men. An opposite result is instead found for changes in total unearned income: 100 
€ increase in non labor income will increase the wives’ share by about 70 percent. So 
far, the signs of the income sharing rule parameters are consistent with those found by 
CFL, although our results have a higher significance level.  
The novelty of our approach allows us to measure the effect of female domestic 
productivity on the intra-household allocation of resources. According to our estimates, 
given an average productivity value of 1.485, a family with a one percentage increase in 




Table 10 Sharing rule estimates  
 Coefficients    Variable ∂ ∂ m φ  
Log m w ˆ   1421.90  (457.48) ***   333.75  (221.34)†  
log  f w ˆ   -189.00   (171.83)   98.48   (120.33) †  
y ˆ    919.53   (367.47)***   -71.97 (103.75)   
f π ˆ    687.53   (318.26) **   687.53 (318.26) ** 
Log m w ˆ × log  f w ˆ    798.06   (342.45) ***  - 
Log m w ˆ ×  y ˆ     269.09   (198.88)  - 
log  f w ˆ ×  y ˆ   -775.90   (337.72) **  - 
Note: Sample of households with both spouses working. Asymptotic standard 
errors, computed by delta method, in brackets. 




Table 11 Labor supply elasticities  
  Market labor supply  Total labor supply 
  Unrestricted Model  Unrestricted Model  Collective Model 
Men      
Log m w ˆ   -0.309   (0.721)  -0.587  (0.605)  -0.356   (0.276) 
log  f w ˆ   -0.130   (0.510)   0.035  (0.429)  -0.013   (0.091) 
y ˆ    0.000   (0.022)   0.000   (0.018)   0.001   (0.002) 
Women      
Log m w ˆ   -0.135   (0.161)  -0.263  (0.099)***  -0.259  (0.099) *** 
log  f w ˆ    0.147   (0.158)   0.031   (0.097)   0.033  (0.097) 
y ˆ    0.009   (0.003) ***   0.003   (0.002)   0.003  (0.002) 
Note: Sample of households with both spouses working. Asymptotic standard errors, 
computed by delta method, in brackets. 
 
What are the policy implications of adopting the collective perspective on total 
rather than market labor supply, as specified in this paper? The answer is provided by 
comparing the uncompensated labor supply elasticities to changes in individual wage 
rates and non-labor income using the two measures and after imposing the collective 
restrictions (see Table 11). Even though the signs are in most of cases similar, the 
dimension of the effect substantially differs in a few cases. As far as the collective 
specification is concerned, we obtain a negative uncompensated wage elasticity for the 
husband, showing a dominant income effect, and a small but positive value for wife, 
showing a prevailing substitution effect. This evidence is consistent with previous 
international evidence on market labor supply (see Pencavel, 1986), although the female 
uncompensated wage elasticity for total labor hours seems less sensitive to the wage 
rate compared also to the value estimated with market labor hours. Moreover we find 
that the household total labor supplies are complementary, this is particularly evident in 
the female supply. Finally the collective framework detects similar elasticities to non-
labor income: for both men and women the value is positive and rather small. 
To sum up the main empirical results: the implementation of the likelihood ratio 
test, the derivation of the parameters involved in the model, and the estimation of the 
labor supply elasticities are all consistent in highlighting the need for more sophisticated  37
intra-household decision models, that take account of the individual domestic 





In this paper we developed a new technique that allows to estimate individual 
domestic productivity when both couple members work on the labor market. 
An interesting finding is that domestic productivity is an independent determinant 
of labor allocation even for women who may have equalized their marginal product at 
home and on the market.  
Our work was also devoted to testing whether a collective model of total labor 
supply is a better representation of intra-household decision over working/leisure time. 
According to our estimates, we cannot reject the collective model as above specified. 
We reckon however that our analysis is subject to few limitations and that opens 
up future directions for research. In particular, our analysis excludes consumption of 
non- marketable domestic goods.   
The invalidation of the recusivity property for couples with a non working woman 
limits our identification technique to two earner couples only.  
Finally, the fact that the choice of market working hours is so heavily constrained 
in France might well have introduced noise in the whole exercise. In this respect 
repeating the estimates with survey from countries with a more flexible labor market 
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Appendix 1 
 
In order to write down the log likelihood function, we generalise (15) considering a 
non-linear model with heteroskedasticity, as it follows: 
( ) ( ) j j j j ij x g x k h η δ ε δ + + = , ,  with    j = 1, .., n  and i=m,f (A.1).   
where  δ  is the vector of coefficients and x  a vector of variables, including individual 
demographic characteristics Xi, and individual wage rate. 
Furthermore, it follows that (A.1) can be written in a more compact form as: 





⎛ + ≈ 2 2 2 , , 0 η ε σ δ σ j j x g N u  
and  j u  being independent across observations. 
Onwards, we use the following simplifications in the notation (with j = 1, .., n):  
( ) j j x k k , δ = ;   ( ) j j x g g , δ = ;  ( ) 2 2 2 2 , η ε σ δ σ + ≈ j j x g s  
We are now able to compute the likelihood function of a sample ( ij h ,  j x ). It comes 

























      
 
and, for the whole sample, the log likelihood is: 





















− − − = ∑ ∑ π σ σ δ η ε    (A.2) 
From expression (A.2) the vector of the gradient of the likelihood derives. 
Finally, the estimation of model (A.2) by ML will provide a full set of estimates, 
including δ  the vector of coefficients and  j ε , which from total residual  () j j j g u η ε + ⋅ =  will 
be given by the following condition: 
() [ ] ij ij ij ij ij u g E ˆ ˆ = + ⋅ = η ε ε ε  




Table 1.a Estimation of household non labor income 
Variables  
Constant  541.989  (108.985)     *** 
Man’s age  -32.166     (5.677)      *** 
Man’s age 
2  0.440      (0.070)      *** 
Man educational dummies: 
              Bac technique  
32.349   (19.076)     * 
                           Bac general  17.565   (19.353) 
                   Bac +2  151.806  (112.593) 
Man’s age × Bac +2  -3.160     (2.616) 
Man’s age × Univ., post-grad. degree  -0.450     (0.440) 
No. of children  37.767     (4.219)     *** 
No. of children  0-3 years old   11.642   (15.461) 
Other adult  79.812   (36.423)     *** 
City dummy: Paris  17.186   (16.952) 




     2 R =0.14 
Note: in the table results by OLS estimates and robust standard errors 
in brackets. Reference category for categorical variables: CAP/BEP 
educational dummy and not living in the capital. 
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Table 2.a Estimation of men wage rate (in logs)  
Variables  
Constant  2.966    (0.279)   *** 
Man’s age  0.057    (0.014)   *** 
Man’s age
2  -0.001  (0.000)   *** 
Man educational dummies: 
Bac general 
0.246    (0.038)   *** 
   Bac +2  -0.147   (0.148) 
Univ., post-grad. degree   0.018    (0.199) 
Man’s age × Bac +2  0.014    (0.004)   *** 
Man’s age × Univ., post-grad. degree  0.017    (0.005)   *** 
No. of children  -0.008   (0.009)      
No. of children  0-3 years old   0.003    (0.025) 
Other adult  -0.121   (0.072)   * 
City dummy: Paris  0.049    (0.028)   * 




     2 R =0.43 
Note: in the table results by OLS estimates and robust standard errors 
in brackets. Reference category for categorical variables: CAP/BEP 




Table 3.a Estimation of women wage rate (in logs)  
Variables  
Constant  3.073    (0.298)     *** 
Woman’s age  0.046    (0.016)     *** 
Woman’s age
2  -0.001   (0.000)     *** 
Woman educational dummies: 
          CAP/ BEP school 
0.004    (0.026)   
      Bac +2  -0.023   (0.128) 
            Univ., post-grad. degree     0.107    (0.213) 
Woman’s age × Bac +2  0.012    (0.003)     *** 
Woman’s age × Univ., post-grad. degree  0.017    (0.006)     *** 
No. of children  -0.035   (0.015)     *** 
No. of children  0-3 years old   0.102    (0.030)     *** 
Other adult  -0.102   (0.062)     * 
City dummy: Paris  0.143    (0.032)     *** 
Internet service at home  0.109    (0.0429)   *** 
 
Obs. 1089 
     2 R =0.37 
Note: in the table results by OLS estimates and robust standard errors 
in brackets. Reference category for categorical variables: Bac general 
or Bac technique educational dummy and not living in the capital. 
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Table 4.a Estimation of women participation to the labor market  
Variables  
Constant  -5.224   (1.369)     *** 
Non labor income  -0.001   (0.000)     *** 
Woman’s age  0.344    (0.070)     *** 
Woman’s age
2  -0.004   (0.001)     *** 
Woman educational dummies: 
   Bac technique          
0.589    (0.262)    ** 
      Bac +2  0.303    (0.970) 
            Univ., post-grad. degree     0.250    (0.793) 
Woman’s age × Bac +2  0.007    (0.024)      
Woman’s age × Univ., post-grad. degree  -0.006   (0.021)      
No. of children  -0.410   (0.059)     *** 
No. of children  0-3 years old   -0.519   (0.155)     *** 
Other adult  0.242    (0.378)     
City dummy: Paris  0.163    (0.166)     *** 
Internet service at home  0.627    (0.256)     *** 
Geographical dummies: Central East  0.264  (0.198)     
                                        West  0..348  (0.154)     ** 
                                         North  -0.171 (0.207)      
Obs. 674 
    Pseudo  2 R =0.21 
Note: in the table results by probit estimates and asymptotic standard 
errors in brackets. Reference category for categorical variables: CAP/ 
BEP school or Bac general educational dummy and not living in the 
capital, but residing in the Centre, or South-west, Parisian region or 
Mediterranean regions. 
 
 